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BEWNIRE OF THE I)ARI SIDE OF THE FAWCE
By Keith A. Rowley

In Berry v. Gulf Coast Wings Inc.,' a
case that has garnered an unusual amount
of attention in both the legal and popular
press for what seems to be a simple
contract dispute,2 a former Hooters
waitress, Jodee Berry, is suing her former
employer for breaching its promise to
award a new Toyota to the winner of an
April 2001 contest. Berry alleges that her
manager, Jared Blair, told Berry and the
other waitresses at the Panama City,
Florida Hooters that whoever sold the
most beer at each participating Hooters
locations during April 2001 would be
entered in a drawing, and that the winner
of the drawing would receive a new
Toyota.
As the contest progressed, Berry
alleges that Blair told the waitresses that
he did not know whether the winner
would receive a Toyota car, truck, or van,
but that the winner would have to pay any
registration fees on the vehicle. In early
May, Blair informed Berry that she had
won the contest, and proceeded to
blindfold her and lead her to the parking
lot outside the restaurant. Waiting for her
there was not a Toyota car, truck, or van,
but a doll of the character Yoda from the
Star Wars movies - a "toy Yoda." Clever,
eh? Blair was laughing. Berry was not.
Berry sued for breach of contract and
fraud. As I tell my students from time to
time, I teach Contracts, not Torts, so I
want to focus on the contract issues and,
more specifically, on the viability of one of
the defenses advanced by Hooters: It was a
3
joke.
The Lessons of Lucy and Leonard
The case best known to most lawyers
and judges in which a party attempted to
avoid contractual liability on the basis that
it was only kidding when it made the
alleged promise or formed the alleged
contract is Lucy v. Zehmer.4 Lucy had been
trying to purchase Ferguson Farm from the
Zehmers for years. One evening, over
drinks, Lucy offered to buy the farm from
the Zehmers for $50,000 ($30,000 more
than Mr. Zehmer had once verbally agreed
to take for the farm before backing out of
the deal). After a fairly lengthy discussion,

Mr. Zehmer wrote the following on the
back of a restaurant receipt: "We do hereby
agree to sell to W.O. Lucy the Ferguson
Farm complete for $50,000 title
satisfactory to buyer." Both Mr. and Mrs.
Zehmer signed the writing, and then Mr.
Zehmer gave it to Lucy.5 A couple of
weeks later, when Lucy informed Mr.
Zehmer that he had the $50,000 in cash
and was ready to close, Mr. Zehmer replied

it, (3) the fact that both Mr. and Mrs.
Zehmer separately signed the writing, and
(4) the Zehmers allowed Lucy to leave
with the signed writing without any
suggestion that they did not intend to be
bound by it "fumish[ed] persuasive
evidence that the execution of the
contract was a serious business transaction
rather than a casual, jesting matter."9
Moreover, and more particularly
relevant to the parties inBerry, the court
also found that, even if Mr. Zehmer
thought the agreement was a joke, "Lucy
did not so understand it but considered it
to be a serious business transaction and the
contract to be binding on the Zehmers as
well as on himself." 10 Expressing what has
come to be known as the "objective
manifestation of assent" test," the court
held:
[T]he law imputes to a person an
intention corresponding to the
reasonable meaning of his words and
acts.... Therefore, a person cannot set
up that he was merely jesting when
his conduct and words would warrant
a reasonable person in believing that
he intended a real agreement.

that he never intended to sell the farm to
Lucy.6

In their answer to Lucy's suit for
breach of contract, the Zehmers argued,
inter alia, that Mr. Zehmer had agreed to
sell the farm to Lucy only "in jest," and
that Lucy knew perfectly well that Zehmer
was planning on keeping the farm for his
son. 7 Reversing the trial court, the
Virginia Supreme Court characterized the
Zehmers' defense as "unusual, if not
bizarre, ... [w]hen made to the writing
admittedly prepared by one of the
defendants and signed by both."s The
court then found that (1) the extent and
nature of the parties' discussions prior to
the execution of the writing, (2) Mr.
Zehmer's acquiescence to Lucy's insistence
that Mr.Zehmer change the wording of
the writing and that Mrs. Zehmer also sign

Whether the writing signed by the
defendants and now sought to be
enforced by the complainants was the
result of a serious offer by Lucy and a
serious acceptance by the defendants,
or was a serious offer by Lucy and an
acceptance in secret jest by the
defendants, in either event it
constituted a binding contract of sale
between the parties.12
A more recent case of note is Leonard
v. Pepsico, Inc.13 Pepsi ran a series of TV
advertisements with the common theme
"Drink Pepsi, Get Stuff' in conjunction
with a "Pepsi Stuff' catalog that included a
variety of items that could be purchased
using "Pepsi Points."' 4 One such
advertisement featured, along with more
mundane items (a t-shirt, a leather jacket,
and sunglasses), a Harrier fighter jet.
continued on page 16
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Displayed across the bottom of the TV
screen was "HARRIER FIGHTER
7,000,000 PEPSI POINTS."'5
Leonard consulted the Pepsi Stuff
catalog. He did not find the Harrier jet
listed. He did find that he could purchase
Pepsi Points for 10 cents each and that he
could order promotional merchandise with
as few as fifteen earned (as opposed to
purchased) Pepsi Points. Leonard
proceeded to raise $700,000 to purchase
7,000,000 Pepsi Points. He then submitted
an order form, along with 15 earned Pepsi
Points, and a check for $700,008.50.16
Through an exchange of correspondence,
Pepsi refused to process Leonard's order,
arguing that the Harrier jet was included
in the advertisement "to create a
humorous and entertaining ad."17
Leonard sued Pepsi alleging, inter alia,
breach of contract. The district court
granted Pepsi summary judgment because,
inter alia, "no objective person could
reasonably have concluded that the
commercial actually offered consumers a
18
Harrier jet."
Starting from the premise that "[a]n
obvious joke ... would not give rise to a
contract," 19 and recognizing the
counterpremise that, "if there is no
indication that the offer is 'evidently in
jest,' and that an objective, reasonable
person would find that the offer was
serious, then there may be a valid offer,"20
the Leonard court explained that "the
obvious absurdity of the commercial"
defeated Leonard's argument that it "was
not clearly in jest."2 1 Judge Wood based
her conclusion on five factors: (1) the
exaggerated claim "that Pepsi Stuff
merchandise will inject drama and
moment into hitherto unexceptional
lives"; (2) the "high improbability" that a
teenager would be allowed to fly a Harrier
and able to do so under the conditions
depicted; (3) the "exaggerated adolescent
fantasy" depicted; (4) the absurd use of a
combat jet to commute to school; and (5)
the fact that amassing 7,000,000 Pepsi
Points would require drinking "roughly 190
Pepsis a day for the next hundred years" or
raising $700,000 to purchase a
$23,000,000 jet - clearly, "a deal too good
22
to be true."
Between the Poles
Lucy and Leonard represent the two
16
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ends of an enforceability spectrum. On one
end, an offer and acceptance that has all of
the outward manifestations of a serious
contract will be enforced, despite the fact
that one of the parties harbored a secret
intent not to be bound. On the other, a
statement or act that no reasonable person
could understand to be an offer or
acceptance will not give rise to a contract,
despite the fact that one party may have
been in earnest. What of the seemingly
vast middle ground between these two
poles?
The richest vein of reported case law
on the enforceability of agreements made
in jest arises out of sham marriages. The
reported cases generally fall into two
categories: those in which both parties
23
agree that the marriage was only in jest,
and those in which only one party argues
that the marriage was only in jest.24 In the
former, courts have found no marriage
contract because, in the words of the
leading case, "[mWere words without any
intention corresponding to them will not
make a marriage or any other civil
contract," provided that "both parties
intended and understood that they were
not to have effect."25 In the latter, courts
have refused to invalidate the marriage
contract because, absent a "show[ing] that
both parties intended and understood that
they were not entering into the
matrimonial relation," one party "could
not avoid the marriage by a mental
reservation [or] secret intention not to
become [wed to the other]."26
"Joke" or "sham" contracts in other
contexts have received somewhat less
uniform treatment from the courts. Still,
there is ample authority that, in the
absence of an obviously outlandish act or
statement, like that in Leonard, or a
context that belies the likelihood of
genuine contractual intent, 27 both parties
must have understood the act or statement
to be insincere at the time the alleged
contract was made in order to avoid
28
forming a contract.
The record in Berry is insufficiently
developed to conclude whether the
context in which Blair announced the
contest to Berry and her co-workers belied
his sincerity, whether Berry believed at the
time of Blair's statement that it was a joke,
or whether a disinterested third party
present when Blair made the

announcement would have concluded that
both Blair and the waitresses knew that
Blair's offer was insincere. It does seem safe
to conclude that Blair's statement was not
so obviously outlandish that no reasonable
person could have taken it seriously. A
new Toyota seems like a rather lavish prize
for the waitress selling the most beer in a
month, but then a $20,000 reward to
anyone who could prove that a car dealer
was selling new vehicles for more than $89
over factory invoice seems even more
disproportionate to the effort required to
earn the prize. Yet, in Rosenthal v. Al
Packer Ford, Inc.,29 the reason the plaintiff
failed to prevail was not because the court
found that the offered reward did not give
rise to a contract; but, rather, because the
court found that the offeror did not breach
30
the contract.
Parting Shot
Whether Jodee Berry is ultimately
successful against Hooters remains to be
seen. However, she has already survived
summary judgment, which suggests that
Hooters will end up spending substantially
more money defending this lawsuit than it
would have cost them to perform. Our
moral: If you are going to use the farce,
beware of the dark side.
The author is an Associate Professor of Law,
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada Las Vegas. He teaches Contracts,
Advanced Contracts, Secured Transactions,
and Economics and the Law, and writes
primarily in the areas of contract law and
securities regulation. He thanks Tabitha
Fiddyment for her researchassistance.
ENDNOTES
I No. 01-2642 Div. J (Fla. 14th Cir. Ct., Bay County,
filed July 24, 2001). Gulf Cost Wings operates the
Hooters in question. Berry v. Gulf Coast Wings settled
shortly before this issue went to press, making the
case itself, but not the legal issues it raises, moot.

2 See, e.g., You've Won a Brand New ... :Proffered

Prize Produces Pique, ABA J., Oct. 2001, at 18; Oh,

What a (Bad) Feeling, Toy Yoda, HOU.
CHRONICLE, Aug. 13, 2001, at A2; Employer
Promised Toyota, Not Toy Yoda, Suit Says,

ANDREWS EMP. LITIG. REP., Aug. 7, 2001, at 12;
Waitress Refuses to be Toyed With, BBC NEWS, July

29, 2001.
3 Two other contract issues suggest themselves: (1)
whether Blair's statement, even if not clearly in jest,
constituted an offer to form a contract that could be
accepted by Berry's performance; and (2) whether

Berry gave consideration sufficient to bind Hooters to
the terms of Blair's offer. The first issue may hinge on

how much similarity the court finds between the
nature of the offer in Berry and the line of "reward"
cases epitomized by Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.,
(1892) 2 Q.B. 484, and, more recently, by Barnes v.
Treece, 549 P.2d 1152 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976). "A
lawful enforceable contract may come into being when
one announces ... an offer or promise that he will give
or pay a reward or prize to a person who performs a
specified act, and the offer is accepted by performance
of the act." Rosenthal v. Al Packer Ford, Inc., 374
A.2d 377, 378 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). Berry sold
the most beer at her restaurant during April 2001.
However, that only entitled her to be entered in the
drawing, not to receive the Toyota.
As for the second issue, courts appear willing to
find consideration to support employer-initiated prizes
and bonus programs as long as the employee, inter alia,
must put forth extra effort or stay employed when she
was otherwise free to leave. See, e.g., Holland v. Earl
G. Graves Publ'g Co., 46 E Supp. 2d 681, 687 (E.D.
Mich. 1998); Olson v. Bondurant & Co., 759 P.2d
861, 864 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). Such offers are
distinguishable from offers of prizes that do not require
any performance by the offeree. The latter generally
lack consideration. See, e.g., Lamb v. U.S. Sales Corp.,
390 S.E.2d 440, 441 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). The
Hooters contest was not simply a drawing for a Toyota.
Berry had to sell the most beer at her restaurant during
April 2001 in order to qualify for the drawing.
4 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
5 See id. at 518.
6 See id.

19 Id.; see also 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 1.11, at 30 (rev. ed. 1993)
(disqualifying "acts evidently done in jest or without
intent to create legal relations" from being considered
offers because they "do not lead others reasonably to
believe that they are empowered 'to close the
with approval in Leonard, 88 E Supp.
contract'"), cited
2d at 127.
20 Leonard, 88 E Supp. 2d at 127-28 (citing Barnes v.
Treece, 549 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Wash. Ct.App. 1976),
and Lucy v.Zehmer, supra, as cases in which a
reasonable person could conclude that the subject act
or statement was not clearly in jest).
21 Id. at 130.
22 See id. at 128-29.
23 See, e.g., Crouch v. Wartenberg, 104 S.E. 117 (W.
Va. 1920); McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. Eq. 225 (1870).
24 See, e.g., Girvan v. Griffin, 108 A. 182 (N.J. 1919);
Inre Imboden's Estate, 86 S.W. 263 (Mo. Ct.App.

1905).
25 McClurg, 1870 WL 5173, at *2.
26 Imboden's Estate, 86 S.W. at 268.
27 See, e.g., Graves v. Northern N.Y. Publ'g Co., 22
N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 1940) (holding
that no contract was formed based on an alleged offer
that ran in the defendant newspaper's "joke column"
and promised to pay $1,000 to the person who would
furnish the offeror with a telephone number the
offeror could have gotten free from directory
assistance).
28 See, e.g., N.Y. Trust Co.v. Island Oil & Transp.

Corp., 34 E2d 655, 655-56 (2d Cir. 1929) (holding
paper transaction between corporate parent and
subsidiary was "asham, which nobody did, and nobody
advised could, understand as intended to be more");
Allensworth v. Allensworth's Executrix, 39 S.W.2d
198, 202 (Ky. 1931) ("[Sltatements, if not made in
earnest and understood by [their recipient] not to have
of a
been made in earnest, cannot be the basis
contract."); Keller v. Holderman, 11 Mich. 248, 248
(1863) (holding that, because "the whole transaction
between the parties was a frolic and a banter, the
plaintiff not expecting to sell, nor the defendant
intending to buy the watch at the sum for which the
check was drawn, ... no contract was ever made by the
parties"). But cf. Deitrick v. Sinnott, 179 N.W. 424,
428 (Iowa 1920) (permitting the defendant to avoid
contractual liability based on his testimony that he
was "merely jesting" and the absence of competent
evidence to the contrary); Theiss v. Weiss, 31 A. 63,
67 (Pa. 1895) (suggesting that the jury could have
excused the defendant from contractual liability based
on the testimony of a disinterested third party "that
was made
the defendant's statement to the plaintiff ...
in a bantering, joking way, and that his understanding
was that the plaintiff regarded it as a joke").
Whether both parties understood the act or
statement to be insincere is a question of fact. See,
e.g., Good v.Chiles, 41 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931), rev'd on other grounds, 57 S.W2d 1100
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1933); Theiss, 31 A. at 67.
29 374 A.2d 377 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
30 See id. at 381-82. NL

7 See id. at 517-18.
8 Id. at 520.
9 Id. at 520-21.
10 Id. at 521.
11 Id. at 522 ("If his words and acts, judged by a
reasonable standard, manifest an intention to agree, it
is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed
state of his mind."); see, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft
Corp., 97 E3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 1996); James
Hardie Gypsum (Nevada), Inc. v. Inquipco, 112 Nev.
1397, 929 P.2d 903, 906 (1996).
12 Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 522 (citations omitted). The
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Lucy court's statement about the law imputing an
intent "corresponding to the reasonable meaning of
his words and acts" has been echoed in a number of
subsequent cases. See, e.g., Am. Rock Salt Co. v.
Norfolk S. Corp., 180 E Supp. 2d 420, 423 (WD.N.Y.
2001); Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Dept. of Soc. & Health
Serv., 790 P.2d 124, 133 (Wash. 1990).
13 88 F Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 210 E3d
88 (2d Cir. 2000).
14 See Leonard, 88 E Supp. 2d at 118.
15 Judge Wood's description of the advertisement is
delightful, but too long to include in the space
allotted. See id. at 118-19. You can view all three
versions of the subject advertisement via links on
Professor Val Ricks's web site. See http://gateway.stcl.edu/faculty-dir/ricks/casebook/Leonardv.Pepsico.htm (last visited May 1, 2002).
16 See Leonard, 88 E Supp. 2d at 119. The court's
opinion does not explain why the check was in the
amount of $700,008.50, instead of $699,998.50 - the
cost of the 6,999,985 Pepsi Points Leonard needed to
purchase to supplement the 15 he had already earned.
Perhaps he added $10 to cover the shipping and
handling charges on the $23 million, 14 ton aircraft.
See id. at 129.
17 Id. at 120.
18 Id. at 127.
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